Joel McCleary, chairman, Q GlobalBiological weapons: U.S. must not repeat the failure of imagination
Joel McCleary, a biological weapons expert, is the chairman and co-founder of Q Global and the founder of PharmAthene; he argues that the U.S. government has not done enough to protect the nation against a biological attack, warns of the need for presidential leadership, and underscores the dangers of biological weapons
Joel McCleary, chairman and founder of Q Global // Source: Q Global
Homeland Security Newswire: Following 9/11 and the anthrax letter attacks shortly after, what measures have been put in place to deter, detect, and prevent similar attacks or even larger scale attacks?
Joel McCleary: Despite a decade of effort, billions spent, and the work of an army of scientists, developers, and government professionals, the United States has made too little progress on biodefense.
Lack of informed, clear, and forceful presidential leadership is the cause of failure. A decade after the attacks, there is no coherent, compelling threat brief to rally Congressional leadership nor is there a precise definition of goals and timelines for agencies to achieve.
The White House has no senior biodefense expert to drive policy and Obama’s nuclear and counterterrorism focus has overshadowed the nation’s biodefense mission.
It is not too late for the administration to lead. The National Security Staff has the capability to reorganize and make progress. Over the last decade significant governmental infrastructures and institutions have been built, which now await directed White House leadership.
As a department, DHS has had the strongest consistent bio-defense leadership. Ridge, Chertoff, and Napolitano understand the threat. Consequently, though their biodefense mandate is limited and only incremental progress has been made for detecting an attack and determining its potential consequences.
Real time detection must be a priority. Sophisticated BWs (biological weapons) are not natural diseases. They deliver massive aerosol doses, which potentially collapse incubation periods and increase virulence. The time frame for saving those within the “blast zone” might be measured in hours, not days. The third generation of sensors will be an incremental step forward in detection, if they work as promised and are affordable.
On sensors and detectors, DOD (Department of Defense) has been an important partner with DHS. This partnership is underlined by the new initiative DOD and DHS have taken with point of care diagnostics.
The most important work done at DHS is the BW consequence assessments. These assessments predict the possible consequences of an attack. The number of projected fatalities is numbing. The White House’s ability to effectively utilize this analysis to rally Congress and create a sense of urgency within the departments is lacking.
Detection and diagnostics are futile if there are no medical counter measures (MCM). MCM development and acquisition policy at the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and DOD have not been successful enough, outside the commendable work on smallpox. It is easy to blame DHHS for this failure, but
