Dissenting voicesChemical facility security bills would limit local control

Here is a scary scenario. A railcar loaded with chlorine gas is parked on a siding adjacent to a large drinking water treatment plant on the outskirts of metropolitan Houston. A steady wind is blowing at 12 mph from the south, moving air from the plant into the city itself. Three terrorists have infiltrated the site, one having been recently hired as a security guard at the plant. In the darkness of the pre-dawn hours, explosive devices are placed on the underbelly of the railcar, calibrated to detonate remotely when a cell phone dials up the special 7-digit code of destruction. Immediately outside the plant perimeter and extending 5 miles to the north are more than 100,000 vulnerable and unsuspecting residents still fast asleep.

Tom Mills, the past chairman of WWEMA and currently vice president of Severn Trent Services, a supplier of water and wastewater treatment solutions, writes in Water World that the recently passed chemical plant safety bill is not going to help in this situation. Before he makes his case, he says that, no, this has this happened before. Is this likely to happen? No. Is this something more for Americans to worry about? No.

Still, he writes, there are forces at work that are taking it upon themselves to put in place legislation that will help to ensure such a scenario never plays out. In late October the House Committee on Energy and Commerce approved HR3258, the Drinking Water System Security Act of 2009, creating new chemical security requirements for drinking water utilities. The bill requires utilities to analyze “methods to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act.” It also contains provisions requiring utilities to adopt what the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines as “inherently safer technology” for water disinfection. For utilities in the highest risk-based tiers, as determined by the EPA, the bill essentially moves the ultimate decision-making authority for which disinfection technology is employed at these plants to the federal authority. The American Water Works Association (AWWA) fought to keep such authority at a local level but lost the battle.

Mills writes that under existing law, no federal agency may regulate security at water and wastewater treatment facilities. With this new legislation, however, water and wastewater facilities will get lumped into existing Homeland Security standards established in 2007 to assess and reduce risk of terrorism at chemical plants; the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). As CFATS is set to expire, the House has put forward another bill, the Homeland Security Appropriations Act (H.R. 2892) to extend CFATS for another year while a broader version of the original act is introduced; H.R. 2868, the Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Act of 2009.

“Together, these bills would move water and wastewater facilities into the category of chemical plants and subject them to the same level of risk assessment along with federal jurisdiction,” Mills writes. Before these bills can become law they will require similar action, support and compromise from the Senate. While this may not happen quickly by commercial standards, there is momentum and support in Congress and we could see law passed within the next year. “At issue is a further shift of control from local and state hands to the federal level,” he writes.

“Certainly, the interests and concerns for local communities have to be at the forefront of decisions made by the local utilities,” Mills adds. “Is the federal government better equipped to balance the risk of terrorism against the risk associated with selecting the best, most effective treatment technology - more so than those who built and operate these facilities? Is this in the best interests of the community and the taxpayer or is it simply another move to strengthen authority and grow what is an already bloated federal government? Quite frankly, I am very skeptical.”