BioterrorismDay of synthetic pathogens-based bioterrorism nears
Scientists have been engineering genetic sequences for decades and commercial gene sequencing has been around for years — but this year, researchers for the first time were able to design and produce cells that do not exist in nature without using pre-existing biological matter — marking the latest evolution in the rapidly advancing field of synthetic biology; the developments could pave the way for advancements in medicine, energy, and agriculture, but also could put sensitive materials in the wrong hands; it will soon be possible to recreate bacterial pathogens like smallpox — and even enhance these pathogens, making them more potent
The new ability of scientists to produce disease materials from scratch has led to concerns that extremists might seek the same capabilities to carry out acts of bioterrorism. Synthetic pathogens are man-made infectious agents that are produced either from the manufacture or adaptation of DNA, cells and other biological structures (“Gene synthesis companies establish measures to counter bioterrorism,” 20 November 2009 HSNW).
In a detailed and unsettling story, Global Security Newswire’s Rachel Oswald writes that while scientists have been engineering genetic sequences for decades and commercial gene sequencing has been around for years, the field continues to move into uncharted territory. This year, researchers for the first time were able to design and produce cells that do not exist in nature without using pre-existing biological matter — marking the latest evolution in the rapidly advancing field of synthetic biology.
Additionally, recent technological advances and lower equipment costs now allow amateur scientists to conduct complex biological experiments such as DNA duplication outside of institutional settings and with machinery purchased online.
The developments could pave the way for advancements in medicine, energy, and agriculture, but also could put sensitive materials in the wrong hands, analysts warn (see “Synthetic Genome Raises Biosecurity Concerns,” Global Security Newswire, 21 May 2010).
“With the advent of DNA synthesis technology, simply restricting access to the actual pathogen no longer provides the security that it once did. Since the gene sequence is a blueprint, once an organism has been sequenced it can be synthesized without using samples of existing cultures or stock DNA,” Ethel Machi and Jena Baker McNeill wrote for the Heritage Foundation in an August memo on the issue.
Oswald writes that the U.S. federal government classifies eighty-two pathogens and biological toxins such as anthrax and smallpox as “select agents” that pose an extreme threat to public health. Access to those materials is strictly regulated — but the complete genetic sequences, known as the genome, for many of these select agents are now available through the Internet.
“The problem is that now you can make DNA. For a number of these, you really don’t need to have access to the sample. The genome of these pathogens are in publicly available databases,” said Jean Peccoud, an associate professor at the Virginia Bioinformatics Institute at Virginia Tech. “For a few thousand dollars you can get the Ebola genome.”
Under the auspices of researching and combating infectious agents, scientists in 2008 used synthetic biology to recreate the SARS virus. Three years earlier, researchers successfully reconstructed the 1918 flu virus, which caused a worldwide pandemic estimated to have killed fifty million people.
“Eventually, it will almost certainly be possible to recreate bacterial pathogens like smallpox. We might also be able to enhance these pathogens. Some work in Australia on mousepox suggests ways of making smallpox more potent, for example. In theory, entirely new pathogens could be created,” Hastings Center Report Editor Gregory Kaebnick said in congressional testimony during a May hearing on Capitol Hill.
Oswald notes that at a 2003 closed seminar hosted by the National Academy of Sciences, scientists discussed the possibility that new “designer” biological weapons could be engineered. Possibilities include genetically modifying two innocuous agents to become lethal when combined or engineering viruses to cause low-level symptoms that become deadly when the infected person takes a common treatment such as aspirin.
Machi and McNeill speculated that malicious actors could acquire the capability to re-engineer organisms to create novel biological weapons by 2020. “If a lab has an ordinary strain of influenza, you could engineer it into the 1918 strain. If you have a bacterium that is resistant to six drugs, it isn’t too hard to make it resistant to eight drugs,” said George Church, a genetics professor at Harvard University and the founder of the Personal Genome Project.
Even if terrorists are unable to weaponize select agents for widespread dissemination, their ability to produce a lethal pathogen could have dire ramifications if, for example, they unintentionally infect themselves and then proceed to infect others, he said.
Church has developed his own proposal for regulating the synthetic biology industry. It focuses on restricting access to the machines needed to synthesize DNA fragments to only licensed government, nonprofit and commercial entities.
