BioterrorismSynthetic biology makes bioweapons easier to make

Scientists and policy makers are no longer unconditionally promoting scientific innovation for fear that current and future biological breakthroughs may lead to dangerous applications. The increasing use of biological engineering for commercial purposes beyond medicine has generated wealth, inspiring individuals in the form of DIYbio (a network of biohackers, amateur biologists, and do-it-yourself biological engineers) to embark on future biological discoveries.

CBRNePortal notes that traditionally, government-backed institutions and pharmaceutical firms fueled biological innovation, but today, the barriers that limited innovation to those institutions are diminishing. The low cost and significantly reduced level of necessary expertise have provided anyone interested in developing biological technology the tools to engage in the practice, anyone including terrorist organizations. San-Diego-based Illumina recently announced its ability to sequence a human genome for $1,000. The implications for terrorism, according to CBRNePortal, are that “the emergence of synthetic biology and DIYbio has increased the likelihood that Al Qaeda will succeed in developing biological WMDs”.

Synthetic biology, the design and engineering of biological devices and systems, has given terrorists the capability to launch attacks using synthetic organisms without detection. CBRNePortal notes that terror groups favor biological weapons because they are “difficult to detect and difficult to attribute without a specific perpetrator claiming responsibility.”

So far, the use of bioweapons by terrorists has been infrequent. Of the more than 113,000 terrorists attacks recorded globally since 1971, only thirty-three have been biological. Seventeen recorded biological attacks occurred during 2001, ten occurred before 2001, and six biological attacks have occurred since 2002 (not counting the most recent Ricin attacks). Bioterrorism has been an uncommon terrorist weapon due to the technical complexity and financial resources required, but as technical complexity diminishes and terrorist organizations increase their investment in bioterrorism capabilities, the potential for large-scale bioterror attacks will increase.

The al-Qaeda network has called for the development of biological WMDs because such weapons have the potential to cause the greatest harm. CBRNePortal reports that before the Afghanistan invasion, al-Qaeda had invested in a bio-laboratory and began recruiting scientists. Thirteen years later, al-Qaeda continues to invest in biological weapons. Last year the New York Times reported on al-Qaeda’s experimentation with ricin production.

Making an effective biological weapon is not easy, and it still requires expertise and financial resources; but these barriers are steadily becoming less difficult to overcome. The international community must thus more urgently develop policies to prevent dangerous applications of synthetic biology. The Biological Weapons Convention prohibits the production of an entire category of WMDs by nation-states, but there is a need to put more effort into preventing non-state actors from developing the capabilities to do so. CBRNePortal notes that “a successful attack with a potent biological weapon, where no pharmaceutical interventions might exist, will be deadly and the impact of such an attack will reverberate around the globe because biological weapons are not bound by international borders.”