TerrorismGrowing Jihadist threat demands new U.S. strategy to combat terrorism: RAND study

There is a growing terrorist threat to the United States from a rising number of Salafi-jihadist groups overseas, according to a RAND Corporation study.

Since 2010, there has been a 58 percent increase in the number of jihadist groups, a doubling of jihadist fighters, and a tripling of attacks by al Qaeda affiliates. The most significant threat to the United States, the report concludes, comes from terrorist groups operating in Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

“Based on these threats, the United States cannot afford to withdraw or remain disengaged from key parts of North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia,” said Seth Jones, author of the study and associate director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND, a nonprofit research organization (also see Seth G. Jones, “The Accelerating Spread of Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, 3 June 2014). “After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, it may be tempting for the U.S. to turn its attention elsewhere and scale back on counterterrorism efforts. But this research indicates that the struggle is far from over.”

A RAND release reports that for the RAND study, Jones examined thousands of unclassified and declassified primary source documents, including public statements and internal memorandums of al Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadist leaders. The study also includes a database of information such as the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, their approximate size and their activity — attacks, fatalities and other casualties.

The RAND study focuses on Salafi-jihadist groups, a particular strand of militant Sunni Islamism. These groups, which include al Qaeda and its affiliates, emphasize the importance of returning to a “pure” Islam, that of the Salaf, the pious ancestors. They also believe that violent jihad is a personal religious duty for every devout Muslim, Jones said.

One reason for the increase in groups, fighters, and attacks is the weakness of governments across North Africa and the Middle East. Weak governments have difficulty establishing law and order, which allows militant groups and other sub-state actors to fill the vacuum.

These trends suggest that the United States needs to remain focused on countering the proliferation of Salafi-jihadist groups, despite the temptation to shift attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific or other regions and to significantly decrease counterterrorism budgets in an era of fiscal constraint, Jones said

The report documents how the broader Salafi-jihadist movement has become more decentralized among four tiers: core al Qaeda in Pakistan; formal affiliates that have sworn allegiance to al Qaeda; Salafi-jihadist groups that have not sworn allegiance to al Qaeda, but are committed to establishing an extremist Islamic emirate; and inspired individuals and networks.

Jones says the threat posed by these diverse groups varies widely. Some are locally focused and have shown little interest in attacking Western targets. Others, like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, present an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, along with inspired individuals like the Tsarnaev brothers who perpetrated the April 2013 Boston bombings. Others threaten U.S. interests overseas, but not the homeland.

In addition to high-level threats from Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the RAND study concludes that there is a medium-level threat from terrorist groups operating in Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Algeria. There is also a low-level threat from Salafi-jihadist groups operating in such countries as Tunisia, Mali, and Morocco.

In response to these threats, Jones says the United States should establish a more-adaptive counterterrorism strategy, pursuing engagement — the use of special operations, intelligence, diplomatic, and other capacities to conduct precision targeting of these groups and their financial, logistical, and political support networks — where there is a high threat to the United States and a low local government capacity.

In other cases, the United States may adopt a “forward-partnering” strategy, Jones said. Forward partnering involves deploying small numbers of U.S. military forces, intelligence operatives, diplomats and other governmental personnel to train local security forces, collect intelligence, and undermine terrorist financing. Unlike an engagement strategy, however, U.S. forces would not directly become involved in the war by conducting raids or drone strikes.

A third strategy, “offshore balancing,” should be used in cases where there is little or no direct threat to the United States. Offshore balancing involves relying on allies and local governments to counter terrorist groups, while avoiding direct engagement or forward partnering.

— Read more in Seth G. Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists (RAND Corporation, June 2014)