An ISIS caliphate is bad news for Iraq, Syria and everywhere else
In both the Sahel region (with AQIM) and in Yemen (with AQAP), the jihadists took as their model the Taliban experience of the “Islamic Emirate” regime that dominated Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. Most leaders of al-Qaeda knew this experience in detail and wanted to reproduce this “state model” on the territories that fell under their control between 2011 and 2013.
State within a state
With the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), the situation is quite different. First, the group — although it came from al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and was established after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — was built as a virtual state. It had “ministers” and “secretaries” and was explicitly called: “Islamic State in Iraq.” It was not until 2013 and the stalemate in the Syrian conflict, that the “Islamic State in Iraq” became the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham” (ISIS).
The territorial unification implied in the change of name was not purely symbolic, since fighters of ISIS were present on both sides of the Iraqi border and already controlled territories in both Iraq and Syria. Gradually, they have sought to ensure territorial continuity between Iraqi Sunni and Syrian Sunni populations.
The political justification for such a military commitment on both sides of the border was not accidental either, since ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared his intention to “erase” the consequences of the 1916 Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement that established the current borders of Iraq and Syria.
Pledging allegiance
The declaration of the “Caliphate” by al-Baghdadi now provides that legal framework that was lacking for the unification of territories on both sides of the borders. It is also an ideological justification for the forced union of jihadist fighters that was previously rejected in 2013 by the main jihadist group in Syria, the al-Nusra Front. The Syrian leader of al-Nusra Front, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, after having rejected any union with ISIS, immediately pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi as the “new Caliph.”
The leader of AQIM, Abu Mussab Abdul Wadud, has also congratulated al-Baghdadi and ensured him of his support. Abdul Wadud previously supported Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia by sending him fighters from North Africa. This message from AQIM is a typical pattern of the old process of recognition of the caliph called the “bay’ah” (allegiance).
This practical reactivation of the concept of the “caliphate” by al-Baghdadi is particularly worrying as it creates a new unifying idea for disparate jihadist groups around a common strategic project. Since Bin Laden’s death, these groups were fragmented, but they might now be able to connect and share an ideology — and, probably, funding given the wealth of the “new caliph.” The “Caliphate Utopia” may reveal to be also a much more efficient tool for jihadist recruitment, especially among young Westerners.
This change might point to the marginalization of the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian, who has not been able to impose himself after Bin Laden’s death. But at the same time it indicates the end of the fragmentation and the beginning of the reunification of jihadi groups around the world within an even more dangerous organization. The global war against terror may finally start.
Mathieu Guidère is Professor of Middle-Eastern and Islamic Studies at University of Toulouse. This story is published courtesy of The Conversation (under Creative Commons-Attribution/No derivatives).
