ISISGoing the distance: does Islamic State have staying power?
The rise of Islamic State (IS) across parts of the Middle East has galvanized the international community in a way not seen since September 11. But before a military response is considered, Western nations need to ask whether IS has staying power. Establishing a functional state will depend upon the militants’ ability to transition the skills gained in fighting wars to those required for governance. In particular, success will be necessary in three areas: establishing public security, delivering basic goods and services, and creating a perception of legitimacy. History tells us these criteria — not democratic niceties, secularism, or a moderate hand — will make or break IS. Snippets of information suggest that IS is likely to last, especially as its power is buttressed by considerable support from Iraq’s disenfranchised Sunni Arabs. The best option to weaken IS is to weaken its ability to monopolize the provision of basic needs to the people. This option will impact those who are passive bystanders swept up in the turmoil rather than the militants, but considering the extreme nature of the threat IS poses, as well as IS’s breaches of the most basic and universally held codes of morality, it may well be that in this case, the ends could justify the means.
The rise of Islamic State (IS) across parts of the Middle East has galvanized the international community in a way not seen since September 11. But before a military response is considered, Western nations need to ask whether IS has staying power. Its spectacular growth may be hiding a dysfunctional governing apparatus that could quickly self-destruct, weakening any justification for a pre-emptive western military response.
If IS is already headed towards implosion, a military response could hasten its demise. But if a functional state with a growing constituency is emerging, military confrontation with the West will only build its legitimacy and help to mobilize new recruits. Identifying which applies in this case is the key question that decision-makers must determine.
Establishing a functional state will depend upon the militants’ ability to transition the skills gained in fighting wars to those required for governance. In particular, success will be necessary in three areas: establishing public security, delivering basic goods and services, and creating a perception of legitimacy.
History tells us these criteria — not democratic niceties, secularism, or a moderate hand — will make or break IS.
In recent times, the efforts of Islamic militants to establish public security have had mixed results. The Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, originating from a network of courts that brought order to a war-torn country, was welcomed despite the harsh enforcement of sharia law as it brought stability and a consistent application of law.
Others such as Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq imploded not long after taking control of western Iraq, largely because its brand of violence was wanton. There was no method to his madness. The exhibition of violence that has so appalled the West, as long as it is directed in support of public security, will contribute to IS’s staying power.
As far as the provision of basic needs, the inability of Islamic militants to provide for the people has brought down established groups. Hamas’s 2006 Palestinian election win was largely seen as a revolt against the corruption of the ruling Fatah party and its inability to deliver services to Gazans.
However, Gaza’s isolation got the best of Hamas, preventing it from delivering its promised improvements in Gazans’ economic circumstances. As a result, Hamas’s popularity diminished, revived only through bursts of conflict with Israel. Today, Fatah once again is Gaza’s preferred government as Hamas proved itself no better in managing an isolated economy than its predecessors.
