Expanded bioterror research raises dual-use risks
Since the fall 2001 anthrax scare the U.S. government has dramatically expanded bidefense research, spending billions of dollars on new facilities, thousands of rsearchers, and new lines of research; important scientific breakthrough have been achieved; the U.S. government’s effort has not been accompanied by an equally enetrgetic camopaign to educate scientists to the fact that this very expansion — and these very breakthroughs — also hold great dual-use risk: An insider with the knowledge, the means, and the malice may inflict great harm; the FAS is doing something important about the dual-use part of the equation
During the cold war there was much concern about dual-use technology, that is, technology which has perfectly inoccuous civiliamn use, but which could also serve for military purposes. These worries have not ended with the end of the cold war. One example would be the case of Iran lying its way to nuclear weapons by building what it claims to be a civilian nuclear infrastructure. Iran can play this game becasue up to a point a civilian nuclear infrastructure is indistinguishable from the infrastrcture a country would need to produce nuclear weapons. This is why the G8 countries are now offering Iran acces to enriched uranium, for example, rather than see Iran enrich its own uranium.
Similar worries about dual-use, or unintended use, also apply in the field of biotechnology. Since the anthrax letter attacks in fall 2001 there has been a growing concern that legitimate scientific work might be misused to threaten public health and national security. We need to worryy about this possibility because the United States, in an effort to combat bioterrorism, has dramatically dramatically expanded the U.S. biodefense research budget since 2001. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), worried about misuse or abuse of these exopanded bioterror research capabilities, has launched an Internet-based portal to illustrate the experience of scientists who have dealt with dual-use scientific research. “Scientists don’t generally think about terrorists using their work to attack the nation, but as technology and the pace of research advances it will become easier for those with nefarious intent to co-opt legitimate science,” says Michael Stebbins, FAS director of biology policy. “Raising awareness of this ugly truth is essential for the security of the nation.”
The FAS Web site demonstrates the implications of dual-use biology research by offering case studies of three different researchers who have done biological dual-use research. The site also offers usefuol information about bioterrorism, bioweapons, and the current laws, regulations, and treaties which apply to biodefense research.
The United States has invested billions of dollars in biodefense research, but neglected to train scientists to recognize the implications of their work. Molecular biological research has made extraordinary advances — but it is precisely these technological breakthorughs which have increased the risk that research could be people who wish to do harm. Tne FAS should be congratulated on its initiative: Scientists must lead the effort to manage dual-use research becasue they are best qualified to identify opportunities for misuse and abuse. The research community also has an interest in policing itself on thie dual-use issue: If it does not, the governmental may impose blanket restrictions and cumbersome rules which may or may not increase security, but which will certainly have a chilling effect on legitimate research.
-see more at the FAS web site
