Fake company obtains licence to buy nuclear materials

There is only one reaction appropriate for the following story: “Say what?” Here is why: Undercover investigators, working for a fake firm, obtained a license to buy enough radioactive material to build a dirty bomb, all with but little scrutiny from federal regulators. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the license to the dummy company in just twenty-eight days with only a cursory review, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in a report to be released today. The GAO, which set up the sting, said the NRC approved the license after a couple of faxes and phones calls and then mailed it to the phoney company’s headquarters — a drop box at a UPS location. “From the date of application to the issuance of the license, the entire process lasted 28 days,” the GAO said. “GAO investigators essentially obtained a valid materials license from the NRC without ever leaving their desks.”

The license which was obtained allowed for the purchase of as many as five portable moisture-density gauges widely used in construction, in which are encased small amounts of cesium-137 and americium 241, two highly radioactive isotopes. Individually, these devices pose little threat because of the small amount of radioactive material, radiation experts say. Still, the devices require an NRC license to be purchased and must be closely safeguarded by companies that use them to avoid theft. The point is that the investigators from the GAO found a way to purchase as many as forty-five of the gauges and could have bought more because they duplicated the NRC-issued license and removed restrictions on the amount that could be purchased. They were able to do so by making counterfeit copies of the license, changed the wording to remove restrictions on how much they were allowed to buy and then ordered enough radiological materials to build a dirty bomb. The GAO said its investigators did not take possession of the radiological materials.

Experts say that militant groups, including al Qaeda, could use conventional explosives and material from sources as common as hospital X-ray departments to build dirty bombs that could spread radioactive waste across urban centers. The GAO sting was requested by a Senate panel that has been exploring post-9/11 security gaps in the U.S. government’s regulation of radioactive material.

The GAO recommended the NRC improve its process for examining license applications for radioactive materials and explore ways to prevent the counterfeiting of licenses.