AnalysisFive years on: Israel-Hezbollah 2006 war
Five years ago today, a war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah after Hezbollah fighters made a foray into Israel, killing several soldiers and carrying the bodies of two of them back into Lebanon; despite the uneven scale of death and damage — Israel has inflicted much more damage on Hezbollah and Lebanon — the war was initially perceived as an Israeli defeat because Israel was unable to stop Hezbollah from firing rockets into Israel during the entire conflict; more recently, though, this initial conclusion has been revised somewhat, with some analysts pointing out that the Israel-Lebanese border has been quiet during the past five years — the longest period it has been so quiet; a respected Israeli military analyst says that the 2006 war was an Israeli failure — and unless Israel changes its definition regarding who the real enemy is, the next Israel-Hezbollah war will be and Israeli failure as well
Lebanon, 2006, and this was considered a Hezbollah victory // Source: peopledaily.com.cn
Five years ago today, a war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah after Hezbollah fighters made a foray into Israel, killing several soldiers and carrying the bodies of two of them back into Lebanon.
Israel responded with a month-long aerial bombardment of south Lebanon and Shi’a sections of Beirut, and made a few land incursions into Lebanon.
During the month-long fighting, Hezbollah fired about 4,000 missiles and rockets into Israeli cities and towns. The toll was uneven: around 1,200 Lebanese civilians and 600 Hezbollah fighters were killed, and 1.2 million Lebanese civilians were displaced. On the Israel side, 43 civilians and 100 soldiers were killed, and 200,000 people were forced to live in bomb shelters for weeks.
Despite the uneven scale of death and damage, the war was initially perceived as an Israeli defeat because Israel was unable to stop Hezbollah from firing rockets into Israel during the entire conflict. More recently, though, this initial conclusion has been revised somewhat, with some analysts pointing out that the Israel-Lebanese border has been quiet during the past five years — the longest period it has been so quiet. They argue that Hezbollah’s propaganda machine may have described the war as a victory, but the sheer damage Israel inflicted on Lebanon’s Shi’a areas has reinforced Israel’s deterrence, causing the Shi’a organization to think long and hard before attacking Israel again.
General (Ret.) Giora Eiland, who left his post as head of Israel’s National Security Council a few months before the war started, does not accept the revisionist view of the war, which he still regards as an Israeli failure. Eiland is a respected military analyst, and when he talks, people listen.
He says that the war reflected a profound weakness in the IDF. There was incoherence among “goals,” “assignments,” and “methods” at every level. Battalions made it into and out of Lebanon without clear purpose or direction.
For Eiland, the most fundamental failure of Israel’s military and political leadership in 2006 was a lack of understanding who the enemy was. “We said, Hezbollah is the enemy, let’s fight Hezbollah. The Lebanese government, military, and infrastructure were not in the game. We could not have succeeded this way. If tomorrow, the third Lebanon war will break out, and we will operate on the basis of the same rules [as Israel did in 2006], then the IDF will have no chance of victory.”
Eiland said that, in relative terms, Hezbollah has improved more than the IDF. Yes, the IDF now has capabilities which will allow it hit Hezbollah more massively and more accurately — but Hezbollah has more and better rockets, and despite improvements in the IDF’s tactics and armaments, Hezbollah will be able to fire more rockets into Israeli towns and cities than it did in 2006. “The bottom line, we will not win [if Israel does not change its definition regarding who the real enemy is],” Eiland says.
The solution? “A threat, and, if need be, a war against the Lebanese state, its infrastructure, and military. No one in the world (including Syria and Iran) wants to see Lebanon destroyed. Our main leverage, both in deterrence before war breaks out and during the war in order achieve quick victory, would be for us to say: Lebanon will be responsible for firing from its territory [against Israel].”
Eiland says that if the next Israel-Hezbollah war lasts for more than two weeks it means an Israel failure. The alternative: Hit Lebanon so hard that the international community, after a couple of days, will become so alarmed about Lebanon’s existence as a state that it — the international community — would intervene to impose a cease fire.
Perhaps this is the message Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak, tried to convey yesterday when he said that Hezbollah now has more capabilities than it had in 2006 — but Israel has augmented its own capabilities as well. Barak said that Hezbollah can now fire about 50 tons of explosives a day into Israel, carried on top of inaccurate rockets and missiles. Israel though, can hit back with more than 1,500 tons of explosives a day — most of it in the form of precision-guided munitions
