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Public healthMore questions raised about security of Boston BioLab

Published 23 November 2010

Boston University has opened a $178 million biolab in a residential area in Boston’s South End; the facility, in which lethal diseases such as Ebola and the plague will be studies, houses only administrative staff, pending state approval; that approval depends on a final risk assessment review — but a new study by the National Research Council questioned the methodology of ongoing risk assessment by contractor Tetra Tech

A critical review of the risks associated with a Boston University biodefense lab in the South End is giving opponents more ammunition for killing the project.

“We have said all along this is not the place for a biolab,” said Mel King, a South End resident, who has opposed the lab since it was introduced in 2002. “With this new report, Boston University has no excuse now for continuing to support something that they know is dangerous.”

The Boston Herald reports that in a report to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) released last week, the National Research Council questioned the methodology of ongoing risk assessment by contractor Tetra Tech.

The $178 million facility on Albany Street is complete, but only houses administrators. State approval is pending a final risk assessment review.

The BU biolab, officially known as the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories, has been a lightning rod for controversy. Partially funded by the NIH, researchers at the Level 4 lab would study vaccines for highly lethal germs that cause such diseases as Ebola and the plague.

King said he is at a loss to explain why BU is so intent on having a facility that is a potential danger to the neighborhood. He said residents have consistently supported lower levels of research that would not threaten the public but would still contribute to curing illness.

In a statement, BU said it is disappointed that Tetra Tech’s preliminary report failed to respond to all of the recommendations made by the National Research Council.

“Although we firmly believe that the high-containment laboratory can be operated safely, we are also convinced that the additional scientific analysis to test our belief is vital to the project’s credibility and is something to which the community is entitled,” BU said. “Unless the final report is thorough, complete, and scientifically sound, the permitting of the laboratory cannot proceed.”

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